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Abstract 
The condition of the optimal currency area as a theoretical basis of the 
monetary integration considers the harmonization of the fiscal and mon-
etary policy crucial in achieving the efficient functioning of the monetary 
union. The issue of sustainability of the monetary union without fiscal un-
ion reaches real intensity in times of crisis and market instability. In that 
context, this paper focuses on the relation of uncoordinated fiscal policies 
and non-fulfillment of the fiscal criteria of convergence with the function-
ing and sustainability of the monetary union. The aim of this research is 
to establish whether, based on the analysed theoretical assumptions and 
empirical case, the fiscal criteria are respected in practice in the member 
countries, and how specificity of the fiscal policy influences the monetary 
integration especially in the years of crisis. We started research with the 
cost-benefit analysis of the monetary union pointing out to the specific 
costs and benefits occurring when a country joins the monetary union. We 
examined the fiscal parameters of the convergence criteria of the member 
states pointing to the problem of heterogeneity of members and deviations 
from the reference values of the Union. The results show that the metodol-
ogy used to establish the set norms of the fiscal convergence cannot cor-
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respond symetrically to all member countries. The results also point to the 
fact that, unlike symmetrical, in the emergence of asymmetric shocks, i.e. 
disorders that affect various countries differently, membership in the mon-
etary union becomes more expensive because of the inability to conduct 
monetary policy. 
Кey words: monetary integration, fiscal policy, convergence criteria, budg-
et, public debt, fiscal discipline, European Monetary Union, asymmetric 
shocks
Introduction
Economic as well as political factors have always been the basis of European in-
tegrations: from desire to stop wars and destructions to economic benefits of fur-
ther integration and establishment of democratic society in Europe. Changes in 
international economic relations in the late 1960s gave an impulse to the estab-
lishment of a new world monetary and exchange rate system. Economic theory 
forsees automatic increase in the monetary and inflation rate abroad in the case 
of a steady monetary increase in countries with a reserve currency, as this was the 
case with the USA in the second half of the 1960s. This occurs due to the fact that 
foreign national banks are buying a reserve currency in order to maintain their 
exchange rates and to increase their own money supply during this process. Con-
temporary international monetary systems are reflections of complex economic 
and socio-political relations, and as such have to be observed from many aspects. 
Advantages of a common currency – decrease in transactions costs, increased 
price transparency and monetary stabililty compared to the costs of replacement 
of their currency and introduction of a new one have been sound reasons which 
made the Member States give up their monetary souvereignty and transfer it to 
supranational level. The European Monetary Union with a common central bank 
and a currency is a specific form of monetary integration, as it has been formed 
without prior official political, i.e. fiscal union. Desirous of defending more ef-
fectively economic interests of Europe, the objective of the European countries, 
partly for political reasons, was to establish closer economic integrations and to 
form a strong economic power which will be equal competitor in the internation-
al economic scene. Nevertheless, the Union neglected the fact that the economic, 
institutional and political difference between countries joining the monetary un-
ion could influence efficiency of integration. Even then the renowned economists 
warned that this could be a risky venture mainly because the monetary union was 
not accompanied by the common budget, fiscal union. 
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In that context, this paper focuses on the issues of a single monetary and non-
compliant fiscal policy and how it reflects on fiscal discipline as precondition of 
Monetary Union succes. We research relation of uncoordinated fiscal policies and 
non-fulfillment of the fiscal criteria of convergence with the level of functioning 
and sustainability of the monetary union. As we will show in the paper, the cost-
benefit аnalysis of the monetary union indicated that the economic differences 
of the countries joining the union can influence the integration efficiency. The 
cost-benefit analysis delivers different results for different member states. On the 
other hand, nonfulfillment of the fiscal criteria in accessing the EMU makes an 
unstable base for further integration existence.
Integration of fiscal policies in the union refers to the role of public finances 
as well as to the budget share. It studies the basic principles, structure and influ-
ence of fiscal (tax and budget) systems of the integrated countries. Integration 
of fiscal policies implies not only harmonisation of national tax and subvention 
systems, but even issues such as public expenditures, transfers (redestribution) 
within states and between the states, regions, economic sectors and individuals, 
as well as prevention of cyclic disturbances and stabilization policy. 
The condition for optimal currency area as a theoretical basis of the monetary 
union considers harmonization of the fiscal and monetary domain crucial for 
achieving optimal combination. High level of fiscal policy integration stands out 
as a special criterion. At this point, we will analyze why metodology used to es-
tablish the set norms of the fiscal convergence cannot correspond symetrically to 
all member countries. The fiscal system of the Union is very complex and differs 
from national fiscal systems of the member states. That is the reason, as the results 
of this analysis show, why fiscal discipline in monetary union has an important 
role in succesuful monetary integration of the member states and maintenance of 
the existing level of economic stability and prosperity. 
1. Theoretical basis of the economic rationality of a common currency
Establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (ЕМU), has been char-
acterized as a huge success of modern integrations. The idea of the EMU es-
tablishment derived from the fact that the monetary integration had significant 
economic advantages of adopting a common currency such as decreasing trans-
action costs, higher price transparency and monetary stability in relation to costs 
of the exchange and introduction of a new currency. 
One of the basic objectives of the EMU establishment was a common mon-
etary policy and maintenance of price stability on the whole territory of the Eu-
ropean Union.
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Introduction of a common currency has been motivated by the following: 
 – The role of the money as an accounting unit is less adequately fulfilled when 
there are more currencies;
 – Foreign currency market becomes narrow for a certain currrency when 
there are a number of currencies, and
 – The fewer currencies, the higher share of import of goods and services in 
consumption (Mundell, 1961).
As easiest measurable and simultaneously the most visible gain from the mon-
etary union De Grauwe (2004) mentions direct and indirect gains from eliminat-
ing transaction costs related to change of the national currency and elimination 
of the risk deriving from unpredictible future movements in exchange rates.. 
Transaction costs related to the exchange of the national currency occur when 
one currency is exchanged for another, and they disappear when countries adopt 
the common European currency. Price transparency distinquishes itself as indi-
rect gain of the introduction of a common currency, i.e. consumers are enabled 
now to see all prices in the same currency and to compare them easily and buy 
where it is cheaper. However, the available data show that there is still a relative 
difference in the price of the selected products. On the other side, the existing 
differences in regulations, customs, language and culture are factors which have 
to be adopted and overcome through monetary integration.
In addition, the mоnetary union contributes to elimination of uncertainity 
of change in the exchange rate. From the microeconomic point of view, the un-
certainty of the future changes in exchange rates leads to uncertainity of future 
company incomes in a sense of uncertainity regarding future prices of goods and 
services. Еlimination of change uncertainity of the exchange rate has undoubt-
edly an effect when a country enters the ЕМU, as the currencies of certain coun-
tries are stabilised by their accession to the ЕU. From the macroeconomic point 
of view, the advantage of a common curency is reflected in the enhanced macro-
economic stability a result of the general price stability, access to financial market, 
possibilities to use external financing, etc. It is important to emphasize that inves-
tors at financial markets, by eliminating foreign currency risk, decrease the risk 
premium as a part of the interest rate price on government bonds, i.e. debt costs 
of the member states decrease.
Advantages of the euro as an international curency are aditional incomes and 
fostering of the domestic financial market activities as foreigners will invest in 
assets and create debt in that currency. This will enable domestic banks to attract 
capital, as it will be attracted by the share and bond market. (Furtula, 2007).
Increase effects derived from economic integration are also observed from 
the aspect of integration effects on the factor market. European integration influ-
ences the increase mainly by influencing the level of investment in human capital, 
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physical capital and knowledge. Shematic summary of the logic of increase effect 
is as follows: European integration – redestribution effect – efficiency improve-
ment – better investment climate – more investments in machinery, skills and /
or technology – higher GDP per capita. (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2010). In case of 
middle-term increase effects, increase in GDP per capita ends in time at a new, 
higher level. In case of long-term increase effects, the increase rate is permanently 
getting higher.
Figure 1. 
Increase effects in EMU.
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Source: adapted from Baldwin, R.; Wyplosz, C. (2010). The Economics of European Integration. 
Belgrade: Data Status, page 16.
2. Cost-benefit аnalysis of the monetary union
In this part of the research paper, we will introduce the cost-benefit аnalysis of the 
monetary union as a base for making a decision on whether and why a country 
should enter monetary union. Basic advantages and benefits of a common cur-
rency introduction are the following: higher microeconomic efficiency through 
increased money usefulness; higher price transparency; elimination of nominal 
exchange rate uncertainity within the area (which is significant from the aspect 
of internal market strengthening, decreaese in the investment risk, fostering of 
foreign direct investments in the currency area); and increased macroeconomic 
stability as a result of general price stability, access to financial market, possibili-
ties to use external funding sources, etc.
Unlike described benefits from the introduction of a common currency, aban-
doning the instruments of economic policy in the monetary union, i.e. dismissing 
the possibility for a member state to manage its monetary policy, is mentioned as 
the most important cost of the monetary union. This means that by joining the 
monetary union a country is deprived of the right to influence the change of the 
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currency price, to determine the money supply or to change short-term interest 
rates. Costs of exchange and introduction of a new currency together with the in-
creased administrative costs incurred due to the establishment of new monetary 
institutions are also costs at the expense of the country joining the union.
As it has already been pointed out that the economic, institutional and politi-
cal differences of the countries joining the union can influence the integration ef-
ficiency, the cost-benefit analysis delivers also different results for different mem-
ber states. We shall analyse the cost-benefit theory on the level of the monetary 
union by using the basis criteria in the establishment of an optimum currency 
area. Countries with broader openness toward EU partners have visible net ben-
efits from their membership in the EMU. The higher the openness level of the 
economies, the bigger the correlation of income among potential union mem-
bers, i.e. the more similar the incomes, the greater the advantage of introduction 
of a common currency. On the contrary, the lower level of the mutual trade be-
tween the member countries, the bigger income differences, and the costs of the 
monetary union dominate.
Graph 1.
Level of the economic openness and effects of introduction of a common currency. 
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Source: adapted from Mongelli, F. P. (2002). New views on the optimum currency area theory: What 
is EMU telling us? ECB, Working Paper No. 138.
One of assumptions of the OCA theory is that the benefit from the increased 
use of a common currency is growing as the area within which it is used is getting 
wider, and that its limit benefit is positive. However, it decreases with the widen-
ing of the area, because the added benefit of the accession of one more country 
in the already wide currency area is lower than in the case when the initial area is 
narrow. (Baldwin and Wyplosz , 2010).
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Graph 2. 
Logic of the optimun currency area theory. 
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Source: Author of Graph 2 – Branka Topić Pavković
This in fact can be understood if we know that each of the member states is 
different, and that the common currency area is getting more and more hetero-
geneous in terms of the living standard, tax system, inflation rate, etc. Differences 
between states, either from economic or political aspect are a favourable basis for 
the development of asymmetric shocks, i.e. different states experience different 
shocks. In this case, the exchange rate becomes very useful in the settlement of 
disturbances and market instability mitigation, and justification of integration is 
called into question. If the countries А and B undergo the same symmetric nega-
tive shocks, they are in the same situation and encounter the same difficulties. 
These states, i.e. the union they belong to, adapt their common foreign currency 
exchange rate to the rest of the world, so that the loss from the exchange rate as 
an instrument of the monetary policy is not felt considerably when joining the 
union. Unlike symmetric shocks, the asymmetric ones are disturbances which 
differently affect different countries and when they occur the membership in the 
monetary union becomes restrictive. In this case the things that suit one state 
harm the other one, and this is explained by the role of the common central 
bank which is not able to simultaneously undertake actions to the benefit of both 
countries. This is inevitable cost of the establishment of the monetary union, be-
cause in the case of asymmetric shock the common exchange rate cannot isolate 
all states belonging to the monetary union. Therefore the approximation of the 
level of development and similarity in the real economic performances of the 
member states, in sense of their convergence, is set as the basic prerequisite of 
efficient and successful EMU functioning and utilization of all EMU advantages 
in order to neutralize the negative effects of asymetric shocks.
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3. Characteristics of fiscal policy in the monetary union
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that all member states of the monetary 
union transferred their monetary sovereignty to supranational monetary institu-
tion, surrendering thereby one of the two macroeconomic instruments, i.e. mon-
etary policy. Monetary policy in coordination with the fiscal policy is the pre-
supposition for successful functioning of a certain economy. In this context the 
issue of fiscal policy is gaining special importance since the fiscal policy remained 
entirely within the competence of the member states. The EU fiscal system struc-
ture is characterized by three basic elements, and these are: ЕU budget as the only 
instrument of policy implementation from the central EU level, tax harmoniza-
tion and coordination of the stabilisation capacity of fiscal policies through the 
Stability and Growth Pact.
Since the European Monetary Union is based on the monetary integration 
theory, i.e. the optimum currency area criteria, it is also necessary to consider 
fiscal policy from the aspect of the optimum currency area theory in order to 
fully understand the role and importance of the fiscal policy within the monetary 
union. Why is this approach necessary? Integration of fiscal policies in the union 
refers to the role of the state finances and the share of the budget. It studies the 
principles, stucture and influence of the fiscal (tax and budget) system of the 
integrated states. Integration of fiscal policies implies not only harmonization of 
national tax systems and subventions, but also issues such as public expenditures, 
transfers (redistributions) within states and between states, regions, economic 
sectors and individuals, and prevention of cyclic disturbances and stabilization 
policy. 
Fiscal system of the Union is highly complex and differs from national fiscal 
systems of the member states. It has important role in market integration and 
maintenance of the existing level of the EU economic and monetary integration. 
Fiscal system encompasses the EU budget and tax systems of the member states 
are harmonised through certain directives and agreements. By respecting certain 
regulations on the EU level the member states have souvereignty in determina-
tion of the height and structure of their budgets whereby they must endeavour 
to have either a balanced or surpluse budget. The analysis of the implementation 
and role of the monetary union fiscal policy through the prism of the optimum 
currency area theory will be explained by the means of theoretical attitudes of the 
relevant literature. 
In his analysis De Grauwe (2004) starts from the assumption of two state 
members of the monetary union which have centralized significant portion of 
their national budgets through central European authorities. The analysis starts 
with the example of asymmetric demand shock between the mentioned states. 
Namely, if in the country A the output decreases and unemployment increases, 
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this will have double effect on the European budget since it is centralized. In the 
A state tax revenues collected through European government decrease, whereas 
the payment of unemployment benefits increases. Contrary to the country B, in 
which the output increases and unemployment decreases. The result is that tax 
revenues from the country B collected by the European government increase, 
whereas expenditures of the European government in the country B decrease. It 
can be noticed that the centralized European budget automatically redistributes 
the income from B to A, thus mitigating the social consequences in the A state 
caused by the change in demand. This can be understood as insurance system, 
whereby the states experiencing negative shocks receive compensation through 
automatic transfers from states experiencing positive shock (Graph 3). 
This issue is further considered in the case of fiscal policies remaining within 
the competence of each member state, i.e. when there is no centralized (gov-
ernment) budget between the observed states. This is e.g. the current status and 
conduct of the fiscal policy in the EMU. In the state A where there is a negative, 
asymmetric shock in relation to the state B, negative demand will lead to in-
creased deficit in the government budget. 
Graph 3.
Asymmetric shock in the countries А and B. 
 
PA
D1
D1
D
D
S
S
PB
YA YB
Country А Country B
Source: adapted from De Grauwe, P. (2004). Economics of MonetaryUnion. Novi Sad: Zoran 
Stojanović Publishing/bookshop , page 56.
With decreased tax income in the state A and without automatic transfers 
from the state B, there is a simultaneous expenditure increase caused by the in-
crease in unemployment benefits. The opposite is happening in the state B – gov-
ernment budget shows either surplus increase or deficit decrease. In the case of 
decentralized budget, the state A will borrow money on the capital market in-
creasing thus its external debt. 
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In the case of asymmetric shocks being the major source of monetary union 
costs, the fiscal policy is the only available instrument. In fiscal policy changes 
in consumption and taxes influence the budget equalibrium, which immediately 
raises the question of public debt financing. According to the optimum currency 
area theory, if the costs are permanent, it is important that there is a sufficient 
flexibility level of wages and prices and /or work mobility. If there is no such 
flexibility, the insurance mechanism may become unsustainable, because it im-
plies then permanent transfers from one state to another (in centralized system), 
or huge public debt (in decentralized system). Insurance system should be used 
only temporary as response to temporary shocks, or as a mode of gaining time 
unless other adjustments are provided. Therefore the key question is: To what 
extent should government budgets be centralized and what are the effects of this 
centralization?
We have seen on the basis of the abovementioned that automatic, permanent 
transfers from one member state to another should be used only occasionaly. If 
such cases were frequently repeated, it is evident that this would reduce fiscal 
discipline of the member states whose deficits are growing, taking into account 
the transfers from the states with surplus. In other words, the transfers of so-
cial protection of the affected states reduce their need for adjustment. The OCA 
theory points out that it is desirable to have a certain degree of national budgets 
centralization in adjustment to asymmetric shocks in different regions. A state 
or a region experiencing permanent shock (in this example through decreased 
demand for output) should adjust to the shock by changing wages and prices or 
by moving production factors. If states affected by shocks were not motivated 
enough for this adjustment, permanent and large transfers would cause a prob-
lem, as at a certain time the citizens of prosperous states would not be willing to 
pay taxes for others, particulary in case of multiple national heterogeneity like the 
EMU. Frequent use of social transfers would inevitably lead to more permanent 
transfers from one group of states to another one, which in the long run would 
endanger the unity of the European (Monetary) Union. (De Grauwe, 2004). 
4. Empirical research of fiscal convergence criteria
In this section we will analyze the fiscal parameters of the member states of the 
monetary union. Based on the collected official data from relevant agencies, 
statistical institutes and financial reports, and a secondary survey consisting of 
analysis of scientific articles, we compiled data from the member countries that 
are the subject of the analysis. The time period of observation is determined as 
the moment of introduction of a common currency, in the years before the crisis, 
during the crisis and upon leaving the crisis period. The expected results should 
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indicate the causal relation of the unfulfilled fiscal convergence criteria and the 
worsening during the crisis when market volatility is more pronounced and in-
tensified. Тhis hypothesis is based on the dependent variable - monetary integra-
tion and its indicators - Public debt as a percentage of GDP and Budget deficit as 
a percentage of GDP, and the crisis as independent variable. 
According to the Maastrich Treaty, nominal convergence has to be fulfilled 
prior to introduction of the euro. But according to the optimum currency area 
theory real convergence is also very important. In the beginning of 1980s the 
majority of researches were dedicated to cost-benefit аnаlysis of monetary inte-
gration and functioning of common European money. The analysis and study of 
the respective literature points out to the importance of convergence. The fiscal 
criteria of budget convergence stand out among the basic convergence criteria 
and imply the following:
1. Budget deficit of the member states should not be higher than 3% of GDP 
(and if it is higher, deficit should continuously fall and significantly approach 
the rate of 3%); on the other hand, if deviation from the benchmark is 
exceptional and temporary, the remaining thereby should be close to the 
benchmark, i.e. 3%.
2. Public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP (if this is the case, the debt 
should be significantly decreased and approximated to the benchmark at an 
appropriate pace).
4.1. Theory and empirical research of budget deficit of the member states
The complexity of the functioning of the European Monetary Union is reflected 
in the presence of numerous factors used in the analysis of the monetary integra-
tion process, especially in the formulation of quantitative and qualitative criteria. 
Considering the limited scope of the research space, in this paper we focused on 
quantitative fiscal indicators. EMU represents a set of heterogeneous states that 
do not differ only in their size and characteristics, but also in different deviations 
from the reference values  of the Union. The subject of the research includes the 
analysis of the correlation between the level of convergence of the member states 
and the emergence of the debt crisis, whose roots are found in the fiscal indisci-
pline of the members. In accordance with the above described fiscal convergence 
the variables determining criteria are analysed together with their indicators in 
the EMU member states. 
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Table 1.
Budget deficit/surplus of the EMU member states in the period 2002- 2016 (in % GDP)
Year 2002 2005 2007 2008 2010 2013 2016
Member States
Belgium -0.1 -2.5 -0.1 -1.1 -4.0 -3.1 -2.5 
Germany -3.8 -3.3 0.2 -0.2 -4.2 -0.1 0.8 
Estonia 0.3 1.6 2.4 -2.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
Ireland -0.4 1.6 0.2 -7.0 -32.1 -6.1 -0.7 
Greece -4.8 -5.2 -6.5 -10.2 -11.2 -13.2 0.5 
Spain -0.3 1.3 2 -4.4 -9.4 -7.0 -4.5 
France -3.1 -2.9 -2.7 -3.2 -6.8 -4.1 -3.4
Italy -3.1 -4.4 -1.6 -2.7 -4.2 -2.9 -2.5 
Cyprus -4.4 -2.4 3.5 0.9 -4.7 -5.1 0.5 
Luxembourg 2.1 0 3.7 3.3 -0.7 1.0 1.6 
Malta -5.7 -2.9 -2.3 -4.2 -2.4 -2.4 1.1 
Netherlands -2.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -5.0 -2.4 0.4
Austria -0.7 -1.7 -0.9 -1.5 -4.4 -2.0 -1.6 
Portugal -3.4 -6.5 -3.1 -3.8 -11.2 -4.8 -2.0 
Slovenia -2.4 -1.5 0 -1.4 -5.6 -14.7 -1.9 
Slovakia -8.2 -2.8 -1.8 -2.4 -7.5 -2.7 -2.2 
Finland 4.2 2.9 5.3 4.2 -2.6 -2.6 -1.8
Euro area 
(19 countries) -2.7 -2.5 -0.7 -2.2 -6.2 -3 -1.5
Source: adapted from Eurostat, European Commission. Convergence Report,  
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do
In the table above we can see movements of the budget deficit/surplus of the 
EMU member states in the period from before the crisis, throughout the crisis 
and until 2016. We can notice that it mostly moved within the allowed limits 
before the crisis, but during the crisis (2008, 2010) it exceeded the benchmark. In 
2016, through appropriate measures of fiscal policy and stabilization in the global 
market we can see positive trends and stabilization of these parameters.
The review of this indicator imposes a conclusion that the reference value 
established by the Maastricht Treaty, which amounts to 3% as the maximum of 
the deficit in GDP, has not been met by all member states even in the moment 
of accession to the monetary union (these values are bolded in the Table 1). Ac-
ceding countries were given the opportunity to improve the fiscal position of the 
country through the convergence of economic parameters of the country in the 
next few years (e.g. Germany, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia improved the state of 
finances). It is evident that some of the countries did not succeed in this criterion 
of fiscal discipline, but the restrictive measures have never been applied to them. 
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Under the crisis, there is an increased need for state funding and additional in-
crease in borrowing costs, which makes it difficult to access the international 
capital market, while raising the cost of borrowing at the same time. If interest 
rates on government debt exceed the rate of economic growth, debt is dynami-
cally placed, leading to an increasing government debt and budget deficit. We can 
conclude that the state of the budget deficit worsened further in the conditions of 
the crisis due to higher borrowing of countries and the fall in GDP, which makes 
debt repayment more difficult. 
An important indicator for the analysis of fiscal discipline and fiscal sustain-
ability as its goal is the consolidated gross debt in relation to the deficit expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. Higher public debt increases the risk of non-performance 
of liabilities based on the debt of the country, which through the higher borrow-
ing costs leads to the problem of sustainability of the budget deficit and deepen-
ing of the debt crisis. Over the past years, a significant increase in budget deficits 
and accelerated public debt growth have been recorded in many European coun-
tries as a result of insufficient fiscal discipline in the years preceding the crisis. 
Taking into account the decline in potential GDP growth in the medium term, 
there was a justified concern about the growth of the deficit/GDP ratio and the 
sustainability of the fiscal positions of individual countries, and the ability of gov-
ernments to service the commitments.
What creates dillema and provokes criticism in academics and expert circles 
are the set norms for the indicators of budget convergence. Namely, according to 
budget deficit indicator as GDP % , it is said that it should not be higher than 3% 
GDP, and public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. Where exactly these values 
come from and have they been defined properly? Budget norms of 3% and 60% 
derive from formulation determining the height of the budget deficit necessary 
to stabilize public debt.2 
d = gxb
whereby:
b – level at which the public debt is stabilized (expressed in % of GDP),
g – growth rate of nominal GDP,
d – government budget deficit (expressed in % of GDP). 
This formula shows that in order to stabilize the public debt at 60% of GDP, 
budget deficit should be run to the level of 3% of GDP and this only with the 
nominal growth rate of 5% of GDP (0,03=0,05x0,6). The question to be asked is: 
Why is the public debt stabilized exactly at 60%? The reason why the percentage 
2 For more detailed explanation refer to Bini-Smaghi et al. (1993). https://link.springer.com/ar-
ticle/10.1007/ BF01000518
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of 60% was determined by the Maastricht Treaty is that it was then the average 
of the debt /GDP ratio in the European Union. However, other numbers such 
as 70% or 50% would also be valid with the note that the deficit level in this 
case should amount to 3,5%, i.e. 2,5%. This rule is further conditioned by future 
nominal GDP growth. If the nominal GDP growth rises above or falls below 5%, 
the budget deficit stabilizing the government debt at 60% will rise above (or fall 
below) 3%.
When the country’s debt is continuously growing with no prospect of time-
ly stabilization, the country is likely to become insolvent. The essence of fiscal 
sustainability indicators reflects in stabilization of the debt/GDP ratio (“prima-
ry budget stabilization”). Sustainability problem can be formulated as follows: 
budget deficit leads to increased goverment debt which will have to be repaid in 
future. If interest rates on government debt exceed the economic growth rate, the 
debt is set dynamically which leads to growing government debt in relation to 
GDP. The government has to take care that the primary budget has a surplus. If 
it does not run a surplus, the debt /GDP ratio will increase, which will certainly 
lead to government debt default (De Grauwe, 2004).
Within the context of theoretical consideration of the debt crisis it is pointed 
out to the importance of a country’s solvency, and therefore the basic determi-
nants are involved in the mentioned theoretical models. Openness of a country 
can infuence the costs of debt servicing and thereby the readiness of a certain 
country to either repay its debt or not. Therefore, the macroeconomic and insti-
tutional variables of debt sustainability were most in the light of country’s sol-
vency (Roubini, 2001), fiscal vulnarability concept as inability to avoid excessive 
budget deficit and public debt (Hemming and Petrie, 2002), particularly within 
the fiscal sustainability concept. As it is the case with the relation of country’s 
debt to GDP, higher indebtedness creates with public and private market partici-
pants perception of increased default risk on country’s debt. This makes pressure 
and incurs higher costs of new indebtedness, decreasing thereby the solvency of 
country. (Alexopoulou, Bunda and Ferrando, 2009).
4.2. Public debt of the EMU member states
When borrowing, states must respect certain principles. The basic principle is 
that capital borrowed abroad or in the country should be invested in production 
and export oriented projects with a higher profit rate than interest on borrowed 
loans, in order to ensure long-term economic growth, debt service and minimize 
losses from the risk of changing foreign exchange rates. Only through increas-
ing GDP, exports and competitiveness can result in higher budget revenues and 
facilitate public debt repayment. If foreign debt exceeds 50% of GDP, the econ-
omy becomes extremely vulnerable to the volatility of financial markets and the 
111
Acta Economica, Volume XVI, No. 28 / June 2018 97 – 120
growth of interest rates, debt servicing becomes a heavy burden, and countries 
are entering a period of weakening economic growth dynamics. 
In the previous section our results show that the crisis with decline in the 
economic activity of countries, the decline in trade flows, and the withdrawal of 
capital further aggravate budget deficit and the state of the indebted countries.
The important reason which occured as explanation and justification of 
budget convergence is default risk on debt and bailout in the monetary union 
(Roubini, 2001). When a country joins the monetary union it loses control of its 
national bank, and thereby also the instrument in form of sudden inflation and 
devalvation, by which it can reduce the real value of the public debt. МacКinnon 
(1996) claimed that this would lead to making pressure on the government to or-
ganize total debt default, which would spread in the Union. The debt level of the 
certain EU member states is so high, that the probability of the total debt default 
in absence of public debt real value decrease through inflation and devalvation, 
is likely to increase. 
On the other hand, government bonds of the member states are distributed 
within the states due to high financial integration in the EMU, and if a certain 
state does not repay its debt, it will have more influence on individuals and fi-
nancial institutions outside the respective state than in the case the state was not 
in the union. This further strenghtens the pressure on other governments to bail 
out a state with debt default. If they are permitted to join the Union, when they 
are hit by crises due to their debt default, they will make stronger pressure on 
someone to bail them out. This was the very reason why the clause “no bail out” 
was embedded in the Maastricht Treaty defining clearly that no member of the 
Union should be liable for bailing out other member states in crisis. On the basis 
of the abovementioned argumentation, the request for fulfilling the budget con-
vergence criteria by a potential member is clear and justified. 
Table 2 shows the general increase in the level of public debt/GDP in the pe-
riod 2008-2012, from the average reference value of 60% to the average level of 
90.8%. This increase in public debt is particularly noticeable in Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal and Ireland. The dominant fact is a constant increase in this indicator on 
average EMU level, reaching over 90% at the end of 2012, and at the beginning of 
2013, when it reached its peak of 91.3% of GDP.
In 2012, the ratio of public debt and GDP amounted to 157.2% of GDP in 
Greece, 127% of GDP in Italy, 127.1% in Portugal, and 117.4% in Ireland. The 
differences in GDP growth, public revenues and expenditures, and consequently 
public debt and budget deficit in relation to the reference values of the Maastricht 
criteria, have resulted in a constantly growing deficit and huge public debt within 
the EMU. This is the result of insufficient fiscal discipline in the years that preced-
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ed the crisis, and reflect the direct or indirect consequences of recent turbulences 
in the global financial market. 
Table 2.
Public debt of the EMU member states in the period 2002-2016 (in % GDP)
Year 2002 2003 2005 2007  2008 2010 2012 2013 2016
Member States
Belgium 103.4 98.4 92 84 92.5 99.7 101.1 105.5 105.7
Germany 60.7 64.4 68.6 65.2 65.1 80.9 81 77.4 68.1
Estonia 5.7 5.6 4.6 3.7 4.5 6.6 9.8 10.2 9.4
Ireland 31.8 31 27.2 24.9 42.4 86.1 117.4 119.4 72.8
Greece 101.7 97.4 100 107.4 109.4 146.2 157.2 177.4 180.8
Spain 52.6 48.8 43.2 36.3 39.5 60.1 86 95.5 99.0
France 58.8 62.9 66.4 64.2 68.0 81.6 90.6 92.4 96.5
Italy 105.4 104.1 105.7 103.3 102.4 115.4 127 129.0 132.0
Cyprus 65.1 69.7 69.4 58.8 45.1 56.3 86.6 102.6 107.1
Luxembourg 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.7 14.9 19.8 21.7 39.0 20.8
Malta 57.9 66 68 60.7 62.6 67.5 70.8 38.8 57.6
Netherlands 50.5 52 51.8 45.3 54.7 59.3 71.3 23.7 61.8
Austria 66.2 65.3 64.2 60.2 68.4 82.4 74.4 68.4 83.6
Portugal 56.8 59.4 67.7 68.4 71.7 96.2 124.1 67.8 130.1
Slovenia 27.8 27.2 26.7 23.1 21.8 38.4 54.4 81.0 78.5
Slovakia 43.4 42.4 34.2 29.6 28.5 41.2 52.7 129.0 51.8
Finland 41.5 44.5 41.7 35.2 32.7 47.1 53.6 70.4 63.1
Euro area 
(19 countries) 68 69.2 70.3 66.4 68.6 83.8 90.8 91.3 88.9
Source: adapted from Eurostat, available at:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/
submitViewTableAction.do
Observing the growth rate of GDP over the years and considering that in 2001 
there was political and economic uncertainty due to high prices of oil derivatives, 
a terrorist attack in the United States and weakening of international security 
and capital markets, there was a slowdown in global economic growth. At the 
same time, the reactions of the financial markets and market participants were 
under the influence of the introduction of the euro as a single currency and the 
expected repercussions on the international economy.
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Graph 4. 
Real GDP growth rate at the level of the European Monetary Union. 
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After the first years of introduction of the euro, in the period 2003-2007, gen-
erally the acceleration of the growth rate was noticed (except for the slower de-
cline in 2005 as a result of the growth of indebtedness of the EMU countries). 
During 2008-2009, a recession rose minus 4.4% of GDP. Mild recovery began in 
2010 and 2011, but not in all EMU countries, which recorded a longer and deeper 
recession (Greece, Portugal, and Ireland). In 2011 and 2012, there was a general 
decline in the rate of GDP, slower growth and several new countries entering the 
negative growth zones. The GDP growth rate indicator is used as a measure to 
assess the process of integration and accession to the European Monetary Union, 
in terms of the degree of convergence of the member states. In addition to being 
an indicator of a decrease in the levels of development of member states, it is also 
used as an indicator of the institutional quality of each country. 
Developing countries, or often referred to as peripheral EMU countries, are 
indebted for insufficient domestic accumulation for investment and the need for 
faster economic growth and competitiveness towards the rest of the Union and 
abroad. In doing so, a country must conduct an effective public debt manage-
ment policy so as to avoid conflict between short-term and long-term general 
macroeconomic goals: monetary stability, economic growth and fair distribution 
of benefits and burden of public debt repayment to current and future genera-
tions. The basic question is how to use borrowed money, because the ability to 
service debt in the future depends largely on achieving other macroeconomic 
goals (economic growth, the balance of payments and the state budget, employ-
ment growth and living standards).
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A state with increasing public debt produces negative spillover effects in other 
parts of the monetary union. A state which allows its debt/GDP ratio to grow 
continuously will increasingly borrow on the capital market of the Union, which 
will influence the raising of the interest rate of the union. Raising of the interest 
rate will influence reversibly the growth of government debt in other member 
states. If governments of these states opt for stabilization of the debt/GDP ratio, 
they will have to conduct a more restrictive fiscal policy. Thereby the unsustain-
able debt increase of one state makes other states conduct a more deflatory policy. 
Therefore this will be for the benefit of other states to have control mechanism 
which should impose limits to the size of the budget deficit in the member states. 
(Buiter and Kletzer, 1990).
The summarized results of the previous analysis indicate that differences in 
the real economic parameters of member states are the base for questionable de-
velopment and further success of the monetary union. The initial differences in 
the fullfilment criteria of access to monetary union and the lack of convergence 
with other members, make the Union fragile and unstable. However, member 
countries could function with these inequalities as long as the average GDP 
growth is positive and borrowing is moderate. The real problems arise when cri-
sis and market disturbances emerge and when asymmetric shocks occur due to 
the differences between the economic strength of individual countries. Oriented 
towards additional borrowing to get out of the crisis, there was a constant in-
crease in public debt, consequent growth of the budget deficit which mostly made 
servicing liabilities difficult.
5. Concept of fiscal discipline in the monetary union 
As previously noted, the importance of fiscal discipline is unquestionable. Basic 
arguments for introduction of fiscal discipline in the monetary union is a fact 
that a state with increased government debt produces negative spillover effect 
to other member states of the EMU. Namely, a state with a continuously grow-
ing debt/GDP ratio, will increasingly borrow on the capital market of the union, 
which will lead to a rise in the interest rate of the Union. Raising the interest 
rate will reversibly influence the increase in the government debt in other states. 
Economic policy measures undertaken in such cases, mostly austerity measures, 
lead to deflatory policy due to restrictive fiscal measures. Therefore it will be to 
the benefit of other states to have a control mechanism which should impose 
limits to the size of budget deficit in the member states. Upward movement of the 
interest rate can also lead to pressures on the European Central Bank to relax its 
monetary policy, which would disturb the basic principles of the monetary union 
as well as its stabilization goals.
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The necessity of rules in fiscal policy relates to the mode in which the mon-
etary union affects the fiscal discipline of the member states. In order to consider 
clearly the differences and opposite arguments, we will summarize discussion 
and draw conclusions from elaborations on this topic made by relevent authors. 
Generally speaking, there are two factors which can change the countries’ mo-
tive reagarding the size of their budget deficit when joining the monetary union 
(De Grauwe, 2012). The first one leads to more lax, the other one to more rigid 
discipline. Speaking about more lax fiscal discipline of the EMUstates it implies 
that the monetary union leads to excessive budget deficit of the member states 
from two aspects. By issuing government bonds, the risk premium involves the 
risk that in future a state will devaluate its currency and its debt default risk. The 
first risk is weaker in the EMU considering the fact that the member states is-
sue debt in “foreign currency”, i.e. there is no devalvation risk (they do not face 
immediately the rise in the interest rate on newly issued debt). The other risk 
component – debt default creates moral hazard problem. It derives from the dif-
ficulty to assess the risk which market participants encounter due to the implicit 
guarantee, i.e. the clause on bail-out impossibility. 
But, will the member states really avoid helping a higly indebted state, whose 
negative spillover effects could spread to other parts of the EMU? We think it is 
necessary to consider the following cases in sense of whether the debt default is 
more likely in the EMU, which would in this case increase the other risk compo-
nent (bailout possibility).
The question whether by joining the EMU the fiscal discipline of the member 
states increases or decreases from the aspect of debt default, will be considered 
with regard to discussions by following authors McKinnon (1996), Eichengrenn 
and von Hagen (1996). There are two ways in which states do not repay their 
debt: either by not repaying it at all, or by reducing its real value with a sudden 
inflation and devalvation. The latter option is possible in souvereign states with 
no supranational bank, which is not the case with the EMU. In the EMU the 
goverment would be put under pressure towards total debt default, which in fact 
could claim that there was an increased risk of total debt default in the monetary 
union. McKinnon (1996) explicitly claimed that the debt default risk would in-
crease due to high indebtedness of the respective member states of the monetary 
union with simultaneous impossibility of inflation or devalvation. Differences in 
interest rates through yield spreads on long-term government bonds point out to 
the level of the risk involved. The occuring diferrential is explained as a premium 
which the government of the respective state has to pay for the risk related to the 
possibility of devaluation of its currency, and increased by the risk of total pay-
ment suspension. 
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With regard to the aspect of more strict fiscal discipline of the member states, 
there is a factor striving to destimulate states from running excessive deficit. 
States joining the union decrease thier ability to deficit monetization, more pre-
cisely, there is no possibility to cover the deficit by excessive currency issuance. 
As result, governments of the member states of the monetary union face stronger 
budget limitations compared to souvereign countries. Souvereign countries have 
“softer” budget limits, which enables them to run a deficit. Analysis of the union 
states and souvereign ones shows that the average budget deficit of the member 
states of the monetary union tends to be lower than those of souvereign coun-
tries. That is why it is possible that restrictions in form of “no money issue” are 
a strong destimulation for running a budget deficit. Additional indirect data for 
the hypothesis that the size of deficit depends on strictness of budget restrictions 
are results delivered by Moesen and Van Rompuy (1990). They classify industrial 
countries according to the level of the total government expenditure. The tested 
hypothesis is that there are more centralized than decentralized governments fac-
ing softer budget restrictions. This is because in a centralized country a larger 
portion of the total government expenditure can be financed through the cur-
rency issuance.
Fiscal rules embedded in the Maastricht convergence criteria and in the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact reflect on creation of the EMU with its primary objec-
tive-price stability. Economic growth is not possible without fiscal discipline of 
all member states. Therefore, we will point to their correlation and summarize 
reasons for the importance of introduction of fiscal rules in the monetary union: 
 – Necessity to introduce fiscal rules in form of Pact can be justified from the 
aspect that most countries run an excessive deficit, particularly after joining 
the monetary union.
 – Fiscal restrictions deriving from these criteria are primarily result of fear 
that too big deficits and public debt of the member states can influence the 
rise in interest rates in other EMU members, which can significantly affect 
price stability.
 – High fiscal deficits can ruin the ECB credibility, and flexible monetary poli-
cy may influence more liberate conduct of fiscal policies of the EMU mem-
ber states. 
 – It is feared that market participants, when drawing up their expectations, 
may assume that certain members will break the rule “no bailout” and help 
certain member states overcome their fnancial difficulties.
 – Member states wishing to join the EMU should respect the set rules, and 
these are primarily the Маastricht convergence criteria and implementation 
of the Stability and Growth Pact.
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Conclusion
The Economic and Monetary Union has ben characterized as huge success of 
modern integration. Monetary policy in coordination with fiscal policy is sup-
position of successful functioning of one economy. In this context the issue of 
fiscal policy gains special importance considering the fact that fiscal policy re-
mained entirely within the competence of the member states. Framework and 
supervision of the EMU fiscal policy laid down by the Stability and Growth Pact 
implied fulfillment of nominal and consequently real convergence which strives 
to establish credidential instrument of development and stability policy in the 
union. The conceptual economic convergence implies an accelerated process of 
social development that results in the approximation of the value of economic 
variables among the member states, which primarily relates to nominal and real 
convergence. When introducing a common currency, it is necessary, according to 
the Maastricht Treaty, to fulfill the nominal convergence (five criteria for conver-
gence). But, according to the theory of optimal currency area, real convergence 
is very important.
Through this research we highlighted the advantages and costs of monetary 
integration from the perspective of an individual country. Recognizing the im-
portance and necessary criteria for joining the monetary union, we analyzed the 
fiscal indicators of the member states at the moment of joining the monetary un-
ion. As previously noted, the results show that some countries have significantly 
lower starting parameters than the other countries. These differences in real pa-
rameters represent an unstable base for further development and the success of 
the functioning of the monetary union, since the countries did not improve their 
fiscal positions in coming years. However, countries could function in this way as 
long as the average GDP growth was positive and borrowing was moderate. Real 
problems were created at the begining of the crisis and market disturbances. Ori-
ented towards additional borrowing as a way of getting out of the crisis, there was 
a constant increase in public debt and consequent growth of the budget deficit. 
As a consequence, borrowing costs rise, the repayment of debt becomes increas-
ingly difficult and the asymmetric shocks grow. Results show that the unfulfilled 
criteria of convergence of Member States contributed to the further deepening of 
the crisis and stressed the need for stricter fiscal discipline among members. This 
deterioration, with the impossibility of adapting monetary policy to shocks from 
the market, makes a single country question the benefits of the Monetary Union.
In order to implement a single monetary policy in the EMU, the ECB needs 
a significant degree of convergence of the member states in order for monetary 
policy to be successfully implemented. In the context of fiscal convergence, the 
share of the budget balance in GDP, the share of private consumption in GDP, 
the share of public debt in GDP, and the share of external debt in GDP are pri-
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marily observed. With the development and expansion of the monetary union, 
along with the heterogeneity of the member states, in Europe it is still an uneven 
growth of macro economic indicators of the countries, which in time of crisis 
especially actualizes the role of fiscal discipline and fiscal policy in the monetary 
union. 
As the results show, the issue of monetary union sustainability with its com-
mon monetary policy, but without fiscal, i.e. political unification, gains its in-
tensity and real significance especially in crisis and market instabilities when 
asimmetric shocks and internal disbalances are more expressed. Practically all 
economic movements depend on the amount and structure of the public debt, 
and therefore managing public debt is becoming more important part of the to-
tal economic policy of a country. Long-term public debt increase must be lower 
than the rate of the economic growth, if we want to avoid illequidity problems of 
a country. We can point out that fiscal policy plays a crucial role in stability of the 
monetary union along with the fulfilling fiscal convergence criteria.
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Резиме 
Услов оптималног валутног подручја као теоретске базе монетарне 
уније, сматра подударање домена фискалне и монетарне политике 
круцијалним за ефикасно функционисање монетарне уније. Пробле-
матика одрживости монетарне уније са јединственом монетарном 
политиком а без фискалног уједињења прави интензитет, добија тек 
у условима кризе и тржишних нестабилности. У том контексту, фо-
кус овог рада односи се на сагледавање везе неусклађених фискалних 
политика и не/испуњености фискалних критеријума конвергенције 
са степеном функционисања и одрживости монетарне уније. Циљ 
истраживања јесте да на бази анализираних теоретских поставки и 
кретања фискалних параметара земаља чланица, непосредно прије 
и током кризе, укажемо на њихов директан или индиректан утицај 
на монетарну интеграцију. У раду смо користили кост-бенефит ана-
лизу монетарне уније, указујући на специфичне трошкове и користи 
које настају када земља одлучи да се прикључи унији. Посматрали 
смо фискалне параметре критеријума конвергенције земаља члани-
ца указујући на проблематику хетерогености чланица и одступања 
од референтних вриједности уније. Резултати анализе формулације 
постављених норми у буџетским индикаторима показују да методо-
логија којом су утврђене постављене норме фискалне конвергенци-
је не могу симетрично одговарати свим чланицама уније. Резултати 
указују и на чињеницу да, за разлику од симетричних, при настанку 
асиметричних шокова, као поремећаја који различито утичу на ра-
зличите земље, чланство у монетарној унији има више трошкова него 
користи због немогућности вођења активне монетарне политике. 
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